Inside the Denver Nuggets’ Plan to Build a Dynasty

Fresh off a summer of victory cigars, champagne toasts, and celebratory dances, the Denver Nuggets are not just preparing to hang their first championship banner in 47 years—they’re eyeing a dynasty.

Nuggets general manager Calvin Booth was candid about his franchise’s goals when we met for lunch in Denver this offseason. “Our guys are tired. It’s going to be hard to repeat,” Booth said. “But if everything is optimized, we should win three or four [titles].”

The Nuggets lost just two players from their postseason rotation and have added reinforcements to replace them. But most important, all of their core pieces are locked in, including Nikola Jokic, a two-time MVP and one-time Finals MVP, who, at 28, is arguably still ascending. The Joker can be a free agent after the 2026-27 season, and thus far, no one has found a way to neutralize his unique skill set. This is, in part, because of the meticulously constructed roster that surrounds him, with a balance of offense and defense, veteran presences, and young talent to accentuate his rare abilities.

Jamal Murray, the postseason dynamo, and Aaron Gordon, a versatile two-way force, are both secured through at least 2024-25; Gordon has a player option in 2025-26. Sharpshooting forward Michael Porter Jr. is under contract until 2027. This nucleus is complemented by a robust ensemble of role players, and the entire symphony is conducted by head coach Michael Malone.

However, looming over this optimistic landscape are new league rules that could severely disrupt the Nuggets’ plans. With more punitive luxury tax measures and a labyrinth of trade, signing, and draft pick restrictions, the new collective bargaining agreement will make it increasingly challenging in the years to come for high-priced teams to retain homegrown talent, let alone make significant acquisitions. With $150 million locked up among their top five highest-paid players—well over the $136 million salary cap even before accounting for the rest of the team—the Nuggets must focus on the middle and bottom of their roster. They have a plan that they began to deploy last year by targeting older rookies through the draft, and even during the Finals, they made a trade for additional picks over the next two years. With no cap room, their draft strategy must be successful for them to maintain an edge over the teams making star acquisitions to close the gap.

“Quite frankly, with this new CBA, dynasties are over,” Warriors star Draymond Green said on his podcast in April. “You’ll always remember us because we’re the last dynasty you’ll be able to speak of.”

Are the days of dynasties truly behind us? Or will the Nuggets show off the new blueprint for sustainable success with a prolonged reign at the top?

The Nuggets win on the floor because of their tall Serbian center, but another 6-foot-11 guy in the front office will decide their future. After a 10-year NBA career as a journeyman, Booth retired in 2009 and then ran his own Amateur Athletic Union program. Tim Connelly wanted to hire him in New Orleans, but Booth wanted to first go solo to gain the experience of running his own program. “A year or two later, I called him like, ‘Hey, what’s up with that interview? I’m tired of dealing with these parents, man,’” Booth said with a laugh. Connelly hired him as a scout for the Pelicans, and Booth later moved on to Minnesota, where he spent time working with Flip Saunders, getting a range of experience as a scout and front office assistant. Then, in 2017, Connelly brought Booth on board in Denver. After Connelly left the Nuggets for the Timberwolves in 2022, Booth took the reins.

“He’s a beautiful mind in basketball,” said Nuggets assistant general manager Tommy Balcetis, who’s been with the organization since 2013. “He sees things that I don’t think a whole lot of other people see. And it’s no disrespect to other people. They just may not have had the breadth of experience that he has.”

Booth is a self-described basketball junkie who you’d think is a coder and not a former pro athlete if not for his height. He loves numbers and thought projects, and he isn’t shy about sharing his ideas, theories, and questions about the game. “I wasn’t like these guys that ended up being tall and had to play,” Booth said. “I love to talk and think about the game.”

Members of the Nuggets front office say that when Booth was hired, he didn’t just maintain the status quo; he homed in on a specific philosophy for player acquisition. Instead of casting a wide net, the Nuggets are more targeted. Internal profiles are created for the types of players they believe will mesh with their existing core. “Of course, we have the best basketball player in the world,” Balcetis said. “So all of a sudden, it becomes a little more clear who we need to go after.”

And who to get rid of. One of Booth’s first moves was to trade Bones Hyland, a young bucket-getting guard who came off the bench but didn’t offer a lot other than scoring. Despite being so young and showing promise, Hyland was dealt for just two second-round picks. The Nuggets didn’t want too much of the same thing on their team.

“I knew you couldn’t have two guys that couldn’t guard, and we couldn’t have two guys that were young and kind of more ‘me guys,’” Booth said. “Mike makes $30 million. He’s one of the best shooters in the NBA. So, Bones, there’s no place for you.”

Moving Hyland freed up minutes for Christian Braun, who became a rotation fixture as a rookie with his versatile defense and selfless offense, building up to his clutch postseason.

Booth’s philosophy is built on four key pillars: basketball IQ, character, positional size, and the absence of skill deficiencies. All of the players the Nuggets target must meet at least three of the criteria, but ideally all four. The first three are fairly self-explanatory, but the latter means a player must be proficient at the typical skills for his position (a wing must be able to defend multiple positions, a center must be able to rebound, etc.). So, at 6-foot-10, it was especially vital for Porter to improve as a defender and rebounder, which he has. If he didn’t, or performed like a guard in those areas, the position would be considered a weak spot.

“Overlap is a silent killer,” Booth said about his team-building philosophy, citing the Lob City Clippers as a case in point. Blake Griffin and DeAndre Jordan both helped define that team, but they lacked the ability to space the floor, and neither was a great perimeter defender. In the backcourt, Booth said that JJ Redick and Chris Paul had too much overlap: “Both have the requisite skills for the position, and both were kind of undersized.”

In contrast, the present-day Nuggets don’t really have any players with overlapping strengths or weaknesses because they’re explicitly working to avoid it, instead targeting players who meet the vision. In Booth’s first offseason as president of basketball operations, he traded Will Barton and Monte Morris for Kentavious Caldwell-Pope, signed Bruce Brown, and drafted Braun and Peyton Watson. A lack of defense and size was swapped for length and versatility, even before the midseason Hyland trade cleared the way for better fits to absorb all the rotation minutes.

But this summer, the Nuggets faced a common challenge for reigning champions: losing key rotation players to more lucrative offers. The Nuggets were priced out of re-signing Brown, so he left for the Pacers, and Jeff Green signed with the Rockets. While not household names, both were valuable. Brown made clutch plays throughout the postseason, including a go-ahead putback layup in the Finals clincher. Green provided steady bench minutes.

“That blow was big,” Booth admitted. The Nuggets dabbled in pursuing veteran free agents, but Booth decided against it to avoid taking minutes away from young players. That decision may make Malone’s job harder in the short term, but it could lead to greater returns down the line.

Malone said Braun will fill Brown’s former role, and he could be even better after working all summer to improve his spot-up jumper and his ballhandling when bringing the ball up the floor. Braun himself thinks Peyton Watson could also be in for a big season after watching from the bench for most of last year: “[Watson] is gonna shock a lot of people with how good he really is,” Braun said. Watson brings tone-setting defense and a high IQ on offense. He is 6-foot-7 with a wingspan of over 7 feet, and he put on 20 pounds of muscle since the beginning of last season, when he weighed in at 200 pounds.

“Some of these teams were trying to get Bruce, trying to make it worth it; it’s like, just be careful what you wish for,” Booth said about the rivals that pursued Brown. “Peyton’s bigger. He’s longer. He’s more athletic. He guards better. He passes better. He doesn’t have the experience, and he’s not as good offensively yet, but we need defense more than we need offense on our team.”

The Nuggets signed veteran Justin Holiday and brought back point guard Reggie Jackson. But they are supportive pieces, and it could actually be more beneficial to the franchise for the young players to carve out rotation minutes, just like Braun did last season, since they can now help and gain experience.

One of Booth’s biggest fears is becoming a team with “no outs,” made up entirely of mercenary vets. Then the vets leave and the team has to go find replacements. “That’s another reason why we got three rookies,” Booth explained. “To get some guys that know how to play, and they’re under control.”

An introduction to those three rookies:

Julian Strawther, drafted 29th: A 21-year-old wing who played three years at Gonzaga. He made over 40 percent of 3s last season as a 6-foot-7 dynamic shooter, and he’s a heady cutter who can handle the ball when needed. Strawther followed a trajectory similar to Braun’s at Kansas by simplifying his game and climbing the depth chart at Gonzaga. “Julian was the offensive version of Christian,” said Booth, who ranked Strawther 17th on his draft board. “He’s hiding in plain sight.”

Jalen Pickett, drafted 32nd: A 23-year-old point guard who spent five years in college: three at Siena and then two at Penn State. At 6-foot-2 without shoes, Pickett has an unorthodox style in that he’ll run offense with his back to the basket, but he will also set strong screens and rip down rebounds. Pickett could flank Murray in the backcourt like Morris used to do. “We’re looking for a true point guard that can switch,” Booth said. “Even if [Pickett] is 6-foot-2, he plays like he’s 6-foot-5.”

Hunter Tyson, drafted 37th: A 23-year-old fifth-year senior from Clemson who can shoot any shot from behind the arc, but at 6-foot-8, his defining quality is his hustle as a cutter, rebounder, and defender. Tyson was the last guy on the bench as a freshman and then emerged as a primary option in his final season, playing every possible role along the way. “It’s all the intangibles. His superpower is his consistency, and it’s born out of his capacity to do the work,” Booth said. “He can go really, really hard in the morning and scrimmage. He could have the same intensity at night and do that again the next day. It reminds me of Dirk [Nowitzki].”

The rookies are all cost-effective: Strawther, Pickett, and Tyson will earn a combined $28.3 million over the next four seasons. That averages to $2.4 million per season for each player. If any of them hit as a rotation player, it’s a massive bargain in an era of ballooning star salaries.

“Somebody could get really, really good coaching for three years and then still be 21 as an NBA [rookie],” said Booth, who was a four-year player at Penn State. “They’re getting the best of both worlds. They’re getting high-level coaching, learning basketball, and they’re still not that old.”

All of Denver’s draft picks fit the same criteria as Braun, who played three years with Kansas, earning his role by turning himself from a role player into a starting fixture, and rose later in the draft process. Braun is due for a bigger role. He’ll make only $3.4 million. “He embodies a lot of what we’re trying to do: a tad older, a tad more mature, and played for a major program,” Balcetis said about Braun.

Booth believes college experience is massively helpful for prospects in their transition to the NBA, and he hopes that following this line of thinking in the draft will lead to more young players who pop.

Instead of drafting raw rookies with theoretically higher upside, the Nuggets opt for more NBA-ready talent. These players may not have as high of a ceiling, but they offer long-term value and fit Denver’s immediate needs. From Denver’s perspective, since the goal is to win a title now and not start from scratch, this mindset means Booth will invest less in raw players, as the organization did before with Hyland and Bol Bol.

“I’m trying to get our scouting group to break away from the attachment to mock drafts,” Booth said. “The whole thing is hilarious. People love mock drafts, so there’s a big market for it that has to happen. But then the draft happens, and then they get graded, and it’s stupid. ... A lot of times, people say to take a swing. [But sometimes those players] end up playing well enough, you end up paying them, and you can’t win with them. What did you really do? And they don’t even have that great of a trade market. It’s an illusion. It’s like fool’s gold.”

Braun turned a promising rookie season into a clutch playoff run, and he’s now helping the Nuggets deploy their plan for sustainable success on the practice court.

One week before the Nuggets officially began training camp, Braun noticed that incoming rookie forward Hunter Tyson set his screens a little differently from how Murray prefers. So he walked over and told Tyson that Murray likes screens a little higher.

“I learned early that most of the time, the worst defender on the court was going to be on me, and that goes for a lot of the rookies,” Braun recalled telling Tyson. “So if you set a good screen, you get a mismatch for Jamal.” And if the defense doesn’t oblige, he showed Tyson where Murray likes the screener to either pop or slip. “If you can help Jamal get a bucket, coaches see things like that. Jamal sees things like that. Nikola sees things like that,” Braun said over the phone. “You can get on the court just by seeing that before a lot of guys.”

Days earlier, Braun enveloped Tyson throughout an entire practice, containing every cut to the rim, fighting over every screen, and contesting every shot. “Christian made Hunter’s life miserable. He couldn’t get a shot off,” Booth said. “And then he did the same thing to Julian.”

Those reps over the summer are helping now during the preseason as the rookies are beginning to get their first taste of NBA action. Tyson had a strong game against the Bulls, making one play in which he dished the ball to Jordan before immediately speeding by a strong defender in Patrick Williams to get to the rim for the basket. And Strawther is shining most as a knockdown 3-point shooter who has a feel for cutting and running the occasional pick-and-roll.

“CB was a perfect example,” Strawther said. “It wasn’t like he had an insane regular season, but they needed him down the stretch, and he performed, and he was ready.”

The Nuggets could run into financial challenges once Murray and Gordon can be up for new contracts in 2025. By that point, the Nuggets could face the repeater tax. Under the new CBA, that’ll come with stiff restrictions on signing players and using draft picks in trades, along with other challenges. These hurdles make it even harder to maintain continuity, so tough choices will need to be made. Assuming Jokic and Murray are fixtures, then perhaps Gordon and/or Porter would need to be moved.

But for now, Denver is deep at the top of the roster. Six existing players are locks for nightly minutes to begin the season: Jokic, Murray, Gordon, Porter, Caldwell-Pope, and Braun. Behind them, minutes are up for grabs. As veterans, Holiday, Jackson, and Jordan will have an edge for a spot in Malone’s rotation. But the rookies will compete alongside other young players, like Watson and center Zeke Nnaji, to fill out the rest.

One thing that’s clear with all of these players is that they have length. Even Pickett, at 6-foot-2 without shoes, has a 6-foot-7 wingspan and plays bigger than his listed size. This isn’t an accident.

After getting the Nuggets general manager job, Booth had his staff study all the teams that made the Finals since 2008 to find out their average wingspan and weight. They took the top eight rotations, exempting the smallest player in the group since it’d skew the averages, and found that the average player had a wingspan of 6-foot-11 with a weight of 228 pounds. If a team’s rotation didn’t hit one of those two thresholds, they weren’t in the Finals—except for the 2013 Heat. “One of the most athletic teams of all time. LeBron. D-Wade. Shane Battier. Chris Bosh,” Booth said. “And so, seeing that, I don’t like trying to be the exception to the rule.”

The NBA is increasingly becoming size dominant. Contenders like the Bucks, Celtics, and Clippers can play lineups with size across all positions. And young teams on the rise, such as the Pelicans, Spurs, and Thunder, are building with lengthy options too. The Nuggets already boast the league’s premier big man in Jokic, but they’re also accumulating length to future-proof their roster for the minutes in which he’s not on the floor.

“We don’t want to unleash this too early,” Booth said. “But Gordon can play the 5, and we can play all those wing guys.”

The Nuggets have Nnaji, who can play in the frontcourt, plus at least six options for spots next to Gordon at wing: MPJ, Tyson, Strawther, Braun, KCP, and Watson. Add in Murray or Pickett as a strong-bodied guard, and these lineups could be crucial against teams that can play with speed, skill, and spacing, such as the reloaded Suns or refurbished Warriors.

Golden State remains in the conversation eight years after its first championship out of four. So, are dynasties really dead? The Warriors will need their youth to pop to maintain that contending status, just like the Spurs needed role players to develop alongside their former Big Three and eventually needed a rising star to emerge, as Kawhi Leonard did. Roster turnover has always been a factor. Winning in the draft has always given teams an edge—it’s just even more crucial now since teams will not be able to spend their way into long-term success.

The Nuggets are making a calculated gamble of their own that hinges on the development of their young talent; they need them to help in the short term and hopefully become fixtures in the future. Booth’s philosophy is clear: It’s better to invest in the future, even if it comes at the expense of immediate glory. “I just want dudes that we try to develop, and it’s sustainable,” Booth said. “If it costs us the chance to win a championship this year, so be it. It’s worth the investment. It’s more about winning three out of six, three out of seven, four out of eight than it is about trying to go back-to-back.”

And if he gets it right, the Nuggets won’t just be the team of the moment; they’ll be the team of the decade.